Curves: The Rise and Fall of a Health Care Cover Story by Gratzer, David
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 25
Issue 2 Symposium On Health Care: Health, Ethics, &
the Law
Article 5
1-1-2012
Curves: The Rise and Fall of a Health Care Cover
Story
David Gratzer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Gratzer, Curves: The Rise and Fall of a Health Care Cover Story, 25 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 363 (2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol25/iss2/5
CURVES: THE RISE AND FALL OF A HEALTH CARE
COVER STORY
DR. DAVID GRATZER*
He used twenty-two pens to sign the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 1 into law.2 On March 23, 2010,
President Obama finally put the ink on the legislative drive that
had stretched for more than a year, and had burned brightly in
the imagination and dreams of Democrats since the demise of
President Clinton's efforts in 1994.
The journey to the East Room signing ceremony had been
long and hard. Not surprisingly, then, the ceremony itself
seemed unusually festive. With the final pen stroke, he com-
mented: "We are a nation that faces its challenges and accepts its
responsibilities. We are a nation that does what is hard. What is
necessary. What is right. Here, in this country, we shape our
destiny."'
The rhetoric may have been tall, but the legislation was
sweeping. Analysts would compare it in scope and importance to
the mid-1960s creation of the Great Society programs of Medi-
care and Medicaid.' In many ways, the legislation rivaled the cre-
ation of Social Security seventy-five years earlier.
* Dr. David Gratzer, a physician, is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Insti-
tute. His research interests include consumer-driven health care, Medicare and
Medicaid, drug reimportation, and FDA reform. His most recent book is THE
CuRE: How CAPiTALiSM CAN SAVE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (2006).
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.,
26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PPACA]. For ease of refer-
ence, PPACA as used here also includes amendments made to it by the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029.
2. See Claire Suddath, Why Did Obama Use So Many Pens to Sign the Health
Are Bill?, TIME (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,
8599,1974490,00.html.
3. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Signing of the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-and-vice-president-signing-
health-insurance-reform-bill.
4. See, e.g., Jonathan Oberlander, Long Time Coming: Why Health Reform
Finally Passed, 29 HEALTH Ave. 1112, 1112 (2010).
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It was a political victory. It was also a policy victory with the
goal of refurbishing a sixth of the national economy.5 And, in
rhetoric and tone, it seemed at least partly a conservative victory.
President Obama had not emphasized the plight of the unin-
sured in his many speeches and press conferences, as the
Clintons had a decade and a half earlier. Rather, he focused on
something more concrete: our pocketbooks. The President and
his staff focused on the need to bend the curve of future health
costs.
Today, a year later, the future of PPACA seems less clear.
Republicans, after big wins in the 2010 midterm elections, prom-
ise to undermine implementation with defunding.' Court chal-
lenges move forward.' Some states balk at their role in
implementation.'
More significantly, the core promise of fiscal restraint
appears shattered. Even Democrats now have moved away from
the rhetoric of deficit reduction and a slowing of health spend-
ing. What then to make of the original talking points? Do we
need to bend the curve? What impact is PPACA likely to have? Is
the Washington approach of subsidies, regulations, and a Medi-
care panel-an attempt to divorce health care from health-
even the right one? In this Essay, I attempt to answer these ques-
tions. I also advise Republicans and moderate Democrats seek-
ing an alternative that the best way to reduce future health costs
5. See Health Care's Share of U.S. Economy Rose at Record Rate, N.Y. TIMES
PRESCIuPTIONS BLOG (Feb. 4, 2010, 12:05 AM), http://prescriptions.blogs.ny
times.com/2010/02/04/us-health-care-spending-rose-at-record-rate-in-2009.
6. See David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, House Votes for Repeal ofHealth
Law in Symbolic Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, at Al.
7. See, e.g., Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., No.
3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *29 (N.D. Fla.Jan. 31, 2011) (holding
individual mandate unconstitutional use of the Commerce Clause power); Va.
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 782 (E.D. Va. 2010) (same);
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 2010 WL 4860299, at
*14 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010) ("[T]here is a rational basis for Congress to con-
clude that individuals' decisions about how and when to pay for health care are
activities that in the aggregate substantially affect the interstate health care mar-
ket."); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893-94 (E.D.
Mich. 2010) (holding same).
8. The most obvious evidence of state resistance was a lawsuit by twenty-
six states seeking to declare some or all of the law unconstitutional. See Ra. ex
rel. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683. On January 7, 2011, Republican governors from
thirty-three states wrote to the President asking him to ease Medicaid provisions
in the law. See William Selway, Republican Governors Threaten to Leave Health
Exchanges to U.S., BLOOMBERG (Feb. 7, 2011, 4:57 PM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2011-01-07/republican-governors-ask-obama-to-allow-deeper-cuts-in-
health-care-costs.html.
will be to keep people out of the health care system in the first
place.
I. BENDING THE CURVE
President Obama's message could not have been plainer.
When he launched his campaign for sweeping health reforms, he
put health care costs at the top of his list of priorities. In a Febru-
ary 2009 budget message, the Administration listed eight princi-
ples to guide reform. The first, second, and last principles
directly addressed health care costs.' On March 5, the President
'.called rising health costs "the biggest threat to our nation's bal-
ance sheet.""o Later, in a summer press conference, President
Obama said:
If we do not control ... [health care] costs, we will not be
able to control our deficit. If we do not reform health
care, your premiums and out-of-pocket costs will continue
to skyrocket. If we do not act, 14,000 Americans will con-
tinue to lose their health insurance every single day. These
are the consequences of inaction. These are the stakes of
the debate we're having right now."
Months later, in his September 2009 address to Congress, costs
were still center-stage. The President referred to the cost of care
eighteen times in his speech," and when he spoke of health care
outcomes, it was only in relation to the price paid to obtain those
outcomes.
Throughout the health reform debate, the President's key
health reform spokespersons maintained this fiscal focus. Few
did it as consistently as the Administration's unlikely point man
for the initiative, Peter Orszag. In his previous job as director of
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Orszag personally
crafted his own "bend the cost curve" message.'" As President
9. See Obama-Care 101: The President's 8 Principles, POLITICO (Feb. 26, 2009,
11:26 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/19362.html.
10. At Summit, Obama Warns Health Care Costs Pose "Biggest Threat" to Econ-
omy, FOX NEws (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/
05/summit-obama-wams-health-care-costs-pose-biggest-threat-economy.
11. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Presidential News Confer-
ence (July 22, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
news-conference-president-july-22-2009.
12. President Barack Obama, Remarks to a Joint Session of Congress on
Health Care (Sept. 9, 2009), available at www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/
Remarks-by-the-President-to-a-Joint-Session-of-Congress-on-Health-Care/.
13. For example, Orszag actually used the phrase "bending the cost
curve" in reference to health spending in a CBO press conference in Septem-
ber 9, 2008 while Mr. Obama was still a senator and presidential candidate.
Peter Orszag, Remarks at Congressional Budget Office News Conference (Sept.
2011] CURVES 365
366 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25
Obama's budget director, Orszag often repeated his bold claim
that "health care reform is deficit reduction.""
To make his austerity message stick, President Obama
threatened to veto any health bill that did not reduce the ten
year projected deficits"-a threat he never voiced to protect
other stated goals of health reform, such as universal coverage or
coverage for patients with pre-existing conditions.
Taken at face value, the President's goal was not to make
America measurably healthier, or extend the average American
life, or conquer a particular disease. Health reform was not
about improving access to life-saving drugs as it is in Britain," or
shortening wait times for care as Canadian reformers promise."
Instead, it was a simple matter of price. Health care messaging fit
snugly into the American wallet: insurance premiums, out-of-
pocket costs, and deficits.
Historians and policymakers alike face a troubling question.
In its final, 2010 incarnation, "ObamaCare" seemed to parody
the business clich6 that one must "spend money to make
money." Americans were told they had to spend almost one tril-
lion dollars more over the next ten years if they hoped to save
less than two hundred billion dollars over the same period. It
was the most unlikely formula for cost containment in American
history.
9, 2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/97xx/doc9706/transcript.
htm.
14. Ryan Lizza, Can Peter Orszag Keep the President's Political Goals Economi-
cally Viable?, NEW YORKER, May 4, 2009, at 50.
15. Throughout 2009, the threat was often phrased a threat "not to sign,"
as if it was a threat to use the pocket veto. For example, at a forum on July 23,
2009, at Shaker Heights, Ohio, the President said, "And that's why I pledged
that I will not sign health insurance reform-as badly as I think it's necessary, I
won't sign it if that reform adds even one dime to our deficit over the next
decade. . . ." President Barack Obama, Remarks at Shaker Heights Town Hall
Meeting (July 23, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress_
office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Health-Care-Reform-Town-Hall.
16. The first and only significant proposal to change the British health
care system in the general election of 2010 was on the first day of the campaign,
when Conservative leader David Cameron called for an expansion in the
National Health Service funding for orphan drugs to treat rare disorders.
17. See First Minister's Meeting of the Future of Health Care 2004, HEALTH CAN.
(Sept. 16, 2004), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/delivery-prestation/fptcollab/
2004-fmm-rpm/index-eng.php (explaining that Canada's last Liberal govern-
ment focused resources on "timely access to care" in the 2004 First Minister's
Meeting); Paul Wells, Political Promises: Martin Says His Promises Beat Harper's.
Problem is No One Believes Any Politician Will Actually Deliver, MAcLEANs (Jan. 11,
2006), http://www.macleans.ca/articlejsp?content=20060116_119667_119667
(reinforcing the consensus by stating that both major political parties promised
wait times guarantees during the 2006 election).
Was this emphasis on deficits, taxes, and fiscal benefits sin-
cere? Or was it simply a tactical attempt to sugarcoat new public
health entitlements in the face of rising deficits and a national
recession?
II. THERE IS A CURVE
Whatever the Administration's true motives, the rising cost
of American health care is a legitimate cause for alarm.
The pressure on taxpayers is cause enough to act: Medicare
and Medicaid costs have consistently outpaced estimates for their
entire history.'" Taken together, federal health programs edged
out Social Security and Defense in 2010 to become the single
largest spending category in the federal budget.1 9 In 2009, the
public sector's share of health costs grew disproportionately
higher as America's unemployment rate forced millions to aban-
don employer-based coverage. Refugees from the private system
now rely on transitional "COBRA" subsidies or Medicaid pro-
grams instead-if they are eligible for either.20 As a result,
America's public health costs exceed private care expenditures;
the system is more than half socialized.
The President also sought to lower cost inflation for private
insurance plans-with a good reason: premium increases for
workers and employers outpaced core inflation for almost two
decades. 2 ' Rising premiums repeatedly cancelled out the bene-
fits of higher worker productivity in the American economy. For
example, in 2009, private sector health costs grew 4.4%, but
18. Then-Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kansas, now the State's governor)
released a good-if partisan-summary of historic estimates prepared by
minority staff of the Joint Economic Committee in June 2009. See SAM BROWN-
BACK,JOINT ECoN. COMM., ARE HEALTH CARE REFORM COST ESTIMATEs RELIABLE?
(2009), available at http://jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&
Filejid=5802c84c-e821-4ab3-baeb793f3ae2e036.
19. See FIN. MGMT. SERV., CITIZEN's GUIDE TO THE 2010 FINANCIAL REPORT
OF THE UNITED STATEs GOVERNMENT 40 (2010), http://www.fms.treas.gov/
frsummary/frsummary2010.pdf.
20. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 cre-
ated a transitional health insurance regime for unemployed workers. Aon Con-
sulting tracked the increased use of COBRA coverage through the recession in
its annual benefits study. See Press Release, Aon Consulting, Unemployed See
COBRA Costs Increase in 2010, While Current Workers Brace for More Health
Care Cost Shifting in 2011 (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://aon.mediaroom.
com/index.php?s=43&item=1998.
21. SeeJohn Commins, Healthcare Costs Soar Above Overall Inflation, HEALTH
LEADERS MEDIA (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/
FIN-258088/Healthcare-Costs-Soar-Well-Above-Overall-Inflation.
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wages grew only 1.5%.22 While careless regulation is partly to
blame (in the form of state mandates requiring Cadillac cover-
age 23 ), patients and consumers only see the costs, not the causes.
President Obama's "cost curve" is certainly worth fearing.
But did his tough talk on cost control survive the legislative
process?
Almost a year after PPACA became law, "bending the cost
curve" seems more a matter of optics than policy. Americans will
soon depend on-and pay for-a complex new system of insur-
ance subsidy entitlements. Yet there is no guarantee they will see
any relief from higher health-care costs.
III. TWISTING THE CURVE
How would Americans judge the President's success in
"bending the curve?" Throughout the 2009-2010 debate, Demo-
crats relied on estimates from the non-partisan CBO to demon-
strate each proposal's fiscal probity. The CBO's scoring of each
legislative proposal took on an almost divine quality, as support-
ers and reporters floated CBO estimates as fact without regard
for uncertainties, risks, or nuances. To ensure estimates were as
positive as possible, legislative drafters carefully crafted certain
policies to avoid triggering unfavorable CBO rules.
In the short term, the CBO's scoring served as the crutch
the Administration clearly hoped it could be. Every financial
adjustment in the eight-month debate left new subsidies and
entitlements intact, while incrementally maintaining a modest
savings projection in keeping with the President's core message
of net restraint.
22. See Wage and Benefits Grow Slower Than Inflation, WALL ST. JOURNAL
REAL TIME EcoNs. (Jan. 29, 2010, 1:32 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/
2010/01/29/wage-and-benefits-grow-slower-than-inflation.
23. See, e.g., David Gratzer, Regulation, Not Size, Is Health Care's Biggest Prob-
lem, WASH. EXAMINER (July 22, 2009), http://washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/
2009/07/manhattan-moment-regulation-not-size-health-cares-biggest-problem;
David Gratzer, Less Is More: In Maryland, Deregulation Is the Bold New Idea, NAT'L
REVIEW ONLINE (May 27, 2004), http://wv.nationalreview.com/articles/
210818/less-more/david-gratzer.
CURVES
CBO SCORING OF SELECTED HEALTH
2009-2010
CARE REFORM PLANS,
HR 3200 HR 3962 HR 3590 HR 4872
(07/17/09) (11/06/09) (03/11/10) (03/18/10)
Net impact of 1042 891 624 788
insurance
provisions
only
10 year deficit 239 -109 -118 -143
reduction
estimate
(Figures in billions of dollars,
only)
CPO SCORING,
10 year projections; costs included are insurance-
SELECTED HEALTH CARE PLANS
(IN BILLIONS)
1.042
891
7?RR
624
N Net cost of
insurance provisions
El 10-year projected
deficit reduction
-110 
-143
HR 3200 HR 3962 HR 3950 HR 4872
(07/17/2009) (11/06/2009) (03/11/2010) (03/18/2010)
However, supporters used these estimates with total disre-
gard for the President's stated objectives. For example, the final
enabling legislation was scored as "saving" $143 billion, as noted
in the above table. But the reconciliation bill included unrelated
provisions to save billions from the federal student loan program,
so attributing $143 billion in savings to the health plan was mis-
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leading.2 4 In fact, the PPACA'S "health-only" provisions scored
just $124 billion in net projected savings by 2019.25
If that result seems promising, consider a few of the warn-
ings the CBO added to its estimates throughout the debate:
* Despite projected savings within both ten and twenty-year
windows, "[t]hose estimates are all subject to substantial
uncertainty."2
* Reviewing the proposed new Community Living insurance
plan, "[t]hese estimated effects of the CLASS proposals
are subject to considerable uncertainty.. . . The CLASS
program could be subject to considerable financial risk in
the future if it were unable to attract a sufficiently healthy
group of enrollees."2 7
* Assumptions of longer term deficit benefits after the tenth
year "reflect an assumption that the provisions of the rec-
onciliation proposal and H.R. 3590 are enacted and
remain unchanged throughout the next two decades,
which is often not the case for major legislation."2
If projecting taxpayer costs for 2,000 plus pages of legisla-
tion was not trouble enough, the CBO was also told to project
the impact of health reform on private insurance prices across
America. In December 2009, the CBO answered with a study
suggesting that while prices should drop for many Americans,
new mandates in the bill should also add costs for over 32 million
Americans covered by individual insurance plans.29 Planned sub-
sidies would assist just over half of those affected.o
To counter fears that private insurance costs might rise after
health care reform, in February 2010, White House officials
insisted their final legislative plan would authorize the federal
24. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SELECTED CBO PUBLICATIONS RELATED TO
HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION, 2009-2010 (2010), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
120xx/docl2033/12-23-SelectedHealthcarePublications.pdf.
25. Id.
26. Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to
John D. Dingell, U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/docl0710/hr3962Dingell-mgr.amend
ment update.pdf.
27. Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to
Tom Harkin, Chairman, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labors, & Pensions, U. S.
Senate, (Nov. 25, 2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/docl0
823/CLASSAdditionalInformationHarkinLetter.pdf.
28. Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 20,
2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/Amend
ReconProp.pdf.
29. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at 197-98.
30. Id.
government to regulate insurance premium increases directly.
The proposal received major media play." But the tabled plan
merely created an advisory role for the federal government, as
many states already regulate insurance prices.3 2
Despite these caveats and setbacks, PPACA supporters still
insisted the bill was about cost containment above all else. For
example, in an interview with PBS' Charlie Rose on February 24,
Orszag stuck doggedly to his view that the savings measures were
transformative. Rose asked whether "the goal always has been
coverage, or cost containment?"" In reply, Orszag maintained
that improving insurance coverage was political cover for cuts to
health care, and not the other way around. He said:
I think it is highly unlikely that we would have gotten any-
where nearly as much in Medicare savings were they not
linked to other things that were desirable ... [a]nd there's
certainly no way that a Medicare commission would have
been passed on the floor of the United States Senate ...
except if it was part of a comprehensive package.
It would be remarkable if Orszag actually believed the words
he spoke. Roughly half of the plan's costs are funded with new
taxes or other revenue measures. Orszag's own proposal for a
tough new Medicare Commission had already been gutted and
its ten-year savings target set at a paltry $15.5 billion." Almost
three-quarters of the final $455 billion in Medicare savings
targets were to come from crude-and easily reversed-cuts to
Medicare fee-for-service payments." The Administration had
floated a "public option" to hold down private sector premiums
through competition, but the idea was dropped.3 ' The Presi-
31. Michael Shear & Dan Balz, Obama Proposal Targets Insurance Rate
Increases, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2010, at M2.
32. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION: VARYING
STATE REQUIREMENTS AFFECT COST OF INSURANCE (1996), http://www.gao.gov/
archive/1996/he96161.pdf.
33. Charlie Rose (PBS television broadcast Feb. 24, 2010), available at
http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10878 (comment available at the
9:28 mark).
34. Id. (comment available at the 10:25 mark).
35. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at 20-21.
36. See Roger Collier, The Pitfalls of PPACA #5-The Effectiveness of IPAB-
Maybe?, HEALTHCARE FIN. NEws (June 21, 2010), http://www.healthcarefinance
news.com/blog/pitfalls-ppaca-5-effectiveness-ipab-maybe.
37. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at 20.
38. Jordan Fabian, Pelosi: Public Option Will Not Be in Health Bill Despite Lib-
eralEfforts to Revive It, THE HILL (Mar. 12, 2010, 6:00 PM), http://thehill.com/
blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/86447-pelosi-public-option-will-not-be-in-
health-bill.
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dent's proposal for a competitive national insurance exchange
was replaced with a far weaker plan for fifty separate state
markets.39
Effective July 30, 2010, Mr. Orszag left the White House-
one of the first senior officials to do so after the Inauguration.4 0
As he left, the cost containment story began to unravel.
In May 2010, the CBO reported that an additional $115 bil-
lion would be needed to implement the bill.4 1 White House offi-
cials deflected the issue to Congress, challenging members to
find other offsets.4 2
Throughout 2009, Orszag and other Administration officials
insisted that wasteful spending was rampant in American hospi-
tals, and cutting that waste could easily pay for the President's
plan. Administration officials held up a Dartmouth Institute
study of American health care costs to "prove" their case on
waste.4" But in June 2010, the New York Times reported on wide-
spread health sector criticisms of the report's comparative
assumptions. For instance, while Administration officials used
the study to claim Texas hospitals were inefficient, critics coun-
tered that the cost difference
between, say, Houston and Bismarck, N.D., may result less
from how doctors work than from how patients live. Hous-
tonians may simply be sicker and poorer than their Bis-
marck counterparts. Also, nurses in Houston tend to be
39. See Peter Grier, Health Care Reform Bill 101: What's a Health 'Exchange'?,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Mar. 20, 2010, at 6.
40. See Richard Adams, Peter Orszag to Resign: First Big Name to Quit Obama's
White House, THE GuARDIAN (June 22, 2010, 5:21 PM), http://www.guardian.co.
uk/world/richard-adams-blog/201 0/jun/22/peter-orszag-resignation-obama-
white-house.
41. See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget
Office, to Jerry Lewis, Comm. on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives
(May 11, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/114xx/doc11490/
LewisLtrHR3590.pdf; see alsoJake Tapper, CBO: Health Care Bill Will Cost $115
Billion More Than Previously Assessed, ABC NEWs (May 12, 2010, 9:08 AM), http:/
/blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/05/cbo-health-care-bill-will-cost-1 15-
billion-more-than-previously-assessed.html.
42. Julian Pecquet, Republicans jump on New CBO Score to Blast Health
Reform Bill, The Hill (May 11, 2010, 4:34 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-
briefing-room/news/97283-republicans-jump-on-new-co-score-to-blast-health-
reform-bill ("If these authorizations are funded, they must be offset somewhere
else in the discretionary budget" (quoting Kenneth Baer, Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Remarks on Cong. Budget Office Report (May 11, 2010)).
43. Ryan Lizza described Orszag as "obsessed" with the Dartmouth find-
ings. See Lizza, supra note 14.
paid more than those in North Dakota because the cost of
living is higher in Houston.44
The article noted that "[n] either patients' health nor differences
in prices are fully considered" in the study.45
In a final blow in August, Trustees for America's Medicare
insurance funds released their 2010 report on the future of the
program. They praised the PPACA for adding twelve years to the
life of the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, according to their own
projections. 46 Cheerleaders for the plan claimed victory. The
liberal Center on Budget and Policy Priorities found the report
"clearly demonstrates that the Affordable Care Act .. . has greatly
improved the financial status of the Medicare program."47
How clearly, exactly? The Trustees themselves noted "sub-
stantial uncertainty in the various projection factors." 4  Worse,
the Trustees' own actuaries filed an alarming dissent, arguing the
report understates how tenuous the savings claims are. Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services Chief Actuary Richard S.
Foster wrote:
While the Part B projections in this report are reasonable
in their portrayal of future costs under current law, they
are not reasonable as an indication of actual future costs.
Current law would require physician fee reductions total-
ing an estimated 30 percent over the next 3 years [to
achieve the projected savings]-an implausible result. 49
With insight that seems to have escaped others in Washington,
Foster described the trap facing Congress. Delivering on the
promised fee-for-service cuts would push care providers out of
public practice. The federal government would be forced to
restore higher fees, wiping out projected savings. If they did not
do so, Medicare's capacity to deliver quality care would rapidly
erode. Finally, echoing eighteen months of similar warnings,
44. Reed Abelson & Gardiner Harris, Critics Question Study Cited in Health
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2010, at Al.
45. Id.
46. See THE BD. OF TRS., FED. Hosp. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS.
TRUST FUNDS, ANNUAL REPORT 25 (2010), https://www.cms.gov/Reports
TrustFunds/downloads/tr2010.pdf.
47. PAUL N. VAN DE WATER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 2010
MEDICARE TRUSTEEs' REPORT SHOWS BENEFITS OF HEALTH REFORM AND NEED FOR
ITS SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.cbpp.org/files/8-
16-10health2.pdf.
48. THE BD. OF TRs., supra note 46, at 26.
49. Id. at 281.
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Foster closed by noting that economic conditions were "unusu-
ally uncertain."o
The Obama White House has been uncharacteristically
quiet in response. Just one year after the President told Congress
that high health-care costs were a lethal threat to the national
economy, the tight deficit reduction margins prescribed by his
own plan have largely vanished.
Yet there has been no urgent presidential call to find new
savings. The $115 billion in new costs have been pushed aside
for a future Congress to manage, despite the President's pre-
inaugural promise to stop "kicking the can down the road.""
The Presidential threat to veto legislation if it failed to reduce
the national deficit is long forgotten.
IV. IN WASHINGTON, THE CURVE BENDS YOU
In May 2010, CBO Director Douglas Elmendorf gave a post-
partum presentation on health reform to the Institute of
Medicine. Reviewing CBO data, Elmendorf felt the President's
plan should reduce "the growth rate of Medicare spending (per
beneficiary, adjusting for overall inflation) from about 4 percent
per year for the past two decades to about 2 percent per year for
the next two decades, "52 assuming all targets are reached. Was
this enough to "bend the curve?" Apparently not:
Rising health costs will put tremendous pressure on the
federal budget during the next few decades and beyond.
In CB0's judgment, the health legislation enacted earlier this year
does not substantially diminish that pressure."
In case listeners missed his point, Elmendorf concluded this way:
Putting the federal budget on a sustainable path would
almost certainly require a significant reduction in the
growth of federal health spending relative to current law
(including this year's health legislation).54
So even if PPACA is law, the threat the President identified
remains unaddressed.
50. Id. at 281-83.
51. For an example of the President's fondness for the phrase, see He
Told Them So: A Conversation with David Walker, Deficit Hawk, WASH. POST (Aug.
30, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/
28/AR2009082802112.html.
52. DouGLAs W. ELMENDORF, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HEALTH CosTs AND
THE FEDERAL BUDGET (2010), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11544/
Presentation5-26-1O.pdf.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
Congressional leaders faced elections at the end of 2010.
Democrats appeared to abandon cost control claims in their own
campaigns during the fall. Politico.com released a leaked pres-
entation dated August 19.55 The notes were purportedly written
to help the President's supporters defend the reforms. Citing
voter research, Lake Research and others advised Democrats to
focus on one of the most popular-and one of the cheapest-
provisions of the bill, offering coverage for Americans with pre-
existing health conditions. The presentation explicitly advised
PPACA supporters not to claim the "law will reduce costs and def-
icit [sic],"6 a complete reversal from the President's own stated
goals for reform.
Clearly, Democrats are eager to defend the plan rather than
improve it. Democrat-sponsored changes are unlikely until at
least 2014, when the key elements of the plan could be imple-
mented. But if the plan is unaffordable, 2014 may be too late as
families begin to rely on new entitlements. So the most likely
agent of responsible change on the horizon is the Republican
caucus in Congress, with strengthened numbers in the Senate
and a majority in the House.
Can Republicans bend the curve? If prior history is a guide,
the answer is likely "no." After all, prior Republican caucuses
also used cost-containment and optimistic CBO estimates as a
cover story for new health entitlements-most notably in the cre-
ation of Medicare Part D."
In their search for an alternative plan, responsible policy-
makers should remember why the White House forwarded pock-
etbook arguments in the first place. Yes, there is a cost curve.
True, the cost curve is consistent with cost inflation in other
55. Ben Smith, New Dem Message: Improve Health Care, Don't Talk Cost,
POLITICO (Aug. 19, 2010, 4:36 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/
0810/The-new messageImprovehealth caredonttalkcost.html.
56. Id.
57. See generally Letter from Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Cong. Budget
Office, to William M. Thomas, Chairman, Comm. on Ways & Means, U.S.
House of Representatives (Nov. 20, 2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/48xx/doc4808/11-20-MedicareLetter.pdf. The CBO priced Medicare
Part 'D' and related programs at approximately $390 billion, including offset-
ting revenues. Id. However, that pricing reflected the CBO's mandate to cost
the program over the next ten years, rather than the full ten-year cost of the
program itself-masking costs deemed since to be almost three times higher.
See also Bobby Scott says Republicans Created $1 Trillion Prescription Drug Plan,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Dec. 7, 2010), http://politifact.com/virginia/
statements/2010/dec/07/bobby-scott/bobbyscott-says-republicans-created-1-
trillion-pr/ (noting that PPACA proponents used a similar approach to obtain
favorable scoring by backloading costs and frontloading revenues in their bill).
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countries,58 but that does not change the fact that it poses a real
threat to the United States-both to taxpayers and to families
and employers in the private market. The fact that PPACA will
not change that trend does not change the fact that the public
sees rising health care costs as a legitimate target for public
policy.
Whether critics of ObamaCare call their response "repeal"
or not, an alternative approach should promote competition and
cost reduction. It should offer federal help to states (or even
market regions) to build truly competitive health insurance
exchanges. It should attack the cost of basic private insurance by
rolling back costly state mandates.
But most of all, true reformers can fight rising costs with a
concerted effort to improve national health-attacking rising
health care demand that is the root cause of the cost curve in the
first place.
V. THE RIGHT CURVE
ObamaCare's focus on insurance prices, costs, and subsidies
is hardly unique. For half a century, American healthcare ana-
lysts have seen health care as an insurance problem, not a health
problem. Regulations were written one after another and have
only reinforced that bias; now one's familiarity with insurance
policy is the primary qualification for health policy expertise. To
pick two recent examples: Mr. Orszag's interest in health policy
has been exclusively financial, and the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius, served as a state insurance
commissioner before her election as Governor of Kansas."
The result is that leaders from both parties fixate on budget
measures, supplier penalties, rationing committees, and other
micromanagement techniques to try to suppress a supply curve.
But managing health supply has proven to be an impossible task.
Across the Western World, governments that broadened
public insurance coverage or spent more public dollars on health
care have faced the same dilemma: more supply only begets
more demand, leading to health inflation increases in excess of
core inflation.'o Just as traffic planners insist wider highways sim-
58. See David Gratzer, 'Cost': Health Care's Four-Letter Word, FORBES
(Aug. 24, 2009, 2:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/24/obama-
administration-health-care-costs-opinions-contributors-david-gratzer.html.
59. Biography: Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/about/biography/index.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2011).
60. See Gratzer, supra note 58.
ply attract more cars to fill them," growth in health insurance
has only encouraged Westerners (especially Americans) to
behave more recklessly and make full use of the new "sick care"
benefits.
Why are health care consumers using so much more care?
Because they can: only thirteen cents of every dollar Americans
spend on care comes directly from individuals themselves, thanks
to the subsidized structure of American public and private insur-
ance models.6 2 That figure should drop further thanks to
PPACA. As their direct share of costs drops, Americans have less
of a direct financial stake in their own health outcomes. The
insurance bias in American health care policy has literally cre-
ated a culture of sick care dependency, redistributing the costs of
unhealthy behavior to the healthy-even if the unhealthy behav-
ior is entirely voluntary.
Tellingly, national data on health demand is still anecdotal
at best. Yet even the arbitrary patchwork of studies on preventa-
ble disease costs paints a frightening fiscal (and physical) picture.
Take just two examples of preventable disease: smoking and
obesity.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) esti-
mates in 2004 placed the (rising) cost of smoking-related ill-
nesses at $98 billion, and the cost of treating second-hand
smoking ailments at $10 billion annually." As obesity threatens
to overtake smoking as America's number one preventable killer,
researchers have shifted focus to the fat epidemic. In 2009, a
CDC study estimated that $147 billion in national health expend-
itures were directly attributable to obesity-almost one in every
ten dollars spent on health care."
Americans have a McVictim attitude toward preventable dis-
eases, assuming that unacceptable social sacrifices are necessary
to prevent them. Former FDA Commissioner Dr. David Kessler
even claims unhealthy foods are now physiologically addictive, so
61. See, e.g., Kelly Thayer, The Road More Traveled: Recent Studies Concur:
New Roads Cause Congestion, GREAT LAKES BULLETIN, Summer/Fall 1999, at 17.
62. See DAVID GRATZER, THE CURE: How CAPITALISM CAN SAVE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE 36-37 (2006) (in 2006, consumers' out-of-pocket share was four-
teen cents of every health care dollar; this reflects the updated figure.).
63. Economic Facts About U.S. Tobacco Production and Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/datastatistics/fact
sheets/economics/econjfacts/index.htm (last visited May 31, 2011).
64. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Study Estimates
Medical Cost of Obesity May Be as High as $147 Billion Annually (July 27,
2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2009/r090727.htm.
2011] CURVES 377
378 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25
much so that he began his recent book with a story about his
inability to resist the temptations of a single cookie."
Yet simply turning back the clock a quarter-century to more
traditional American diets and lifestyles could radically improve
national (and personal) health outcomes, saving billions in the
process. Suppose America slashed its rate of obesity-related ill-
ness by 20% in the next five years-a tough but hardly implausi-
ble goal. Achieve that, and America's care system could save $30
billion or more annually, forever."6 Or Congress could save $20
billion annually simply by ending subsidies for unhealthy food
ingredients." Either step would save more in ten years than the
best projected savings for ObamaCare.
Reforming insurance models to reduce demand has also
shown promising results. Safeway, North America's third largest
grocery chain, is leading the way, experimenting with incen-
tivized health insurance. While critics dispute the actual figures,
Safeway insists it has brought per capita health costs under con-
trol by creating incentives for wellness instead of simply redistrib-
uting the cost of poor health:
According to company statistics, the proportion of employ-
ees classified as obese declined by five percentage points,
while the proportion who were overweight declined by one
percentage point. Meanwhile, 40 percent of workers and
spouses who failed the blood pressure test in 2008 passed
in 2009, 30 percent of former smokers registered as
tobacco-free, and 17 percent who failed the cholesterol test
in 2008 passed in 2009.
Proposed new mandates in early PPACA drafts nearly outlawed
this promising approach. Only an amendment co-sponsored by
SenatorsJohn Ensign (R-Nev.) and Thomas Carper (D-Del.) kept
the experiment legal.69
65. DAVID A. KESSLER, THE END OF OVEREATING: TAKING CONTROL OF THE
INSATIABLE NORTH AMERICAN APPETITE X-xi (2009). It was an orange-chocolate
confection that pushed him over the edge. Id.
66. Or approximately one-fifth of the CDC's lowest recent estimate of the
annual cost of obesity to the American health care system. See Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention Press Release, supra note 64.
67. For a detailed review of these programs and their historic annual
costs, see Harvesting Cash: A Yearlong Investigation by The Washington Post, WASH.
PosT, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/interactives/farmaid/
(last visited May 28, 2011) (showing that actual food subsidy totals vary annually
because many are based on price-support systems).
68. David S. Hilzenrath, Misleading Claims About Safeway Weliness Programs
Shape Health-Care Bill WASH. PosT, Jan. 17, 2010, at Gl, G4.
69. Michelle Andrews, If Your Waistline Grows, Should Your Premiums, Too?,
N.Y. TIMEs PRESCRIFTIONs BLOC (Oct. 8, 2009, 3:23 PM), http://prescriptions.
In an ironic turn, the White House has a plan to attack
health demand. However, as if to prove it to be an afterthought,
the initiative is led by the East Wing, not the West Wing. Attack-
ing health care demand is the First Lady'sjob, delivered through a
program called "Let's Move"-a modest effort to improve inner
city food choices and promote childhood exercise in cooperation
with state governors.o
Americans are spending too much for the health care out-
comes they get. But if policymakers in Washington attacked the
health curve instead of the health insurance curve, they would
see that challenge in a different light. In the words of one of
ObamaCare's liberal critics:
The only sure way to bend the curve and curb the rate of
increase in health care costs is to keep people out of the
sick care system, to put as much profit in prevention as
there is in acute care, and to put financial gain and pain
into how individuals take (or don't take) care of
themselves.7 1
The speaker? Joseph Califano-who served as President Lyndon
Johnson's domestic policy advisor during the introduction of
Medicare. Later, Califano was President Jimmy Carter's Health,
Education, and Welfare Secretary. He now serves as Chairman of
the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse.72
If one of the founding fathers of Medicare can reach those
conclusions, it's time for those tinkering with Medicare to at least
consider them. The lesson from the rise and fall of President
Obama's cost curve cover story is that America must stop trying
to bend the curve, and instead seek to prevent the curve
outright.
blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/if-your-waistline-grows-should-your-premiums-
too/.
70. LET'S MOVE, http://www.letsmove.gov/ (last visited May 31, 2011).
71. Joseph Califano, Bending the Curve Requires Health Care Reform, Not just
Sick Care Reform: A History Lesson, KAISER HEALTr NEWS (Aug. 10, 2009), http://
www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2009/August/081009Califano.aspx.
72. About the Chairman, THE CHAIRMAN'S CORNER, http://chairman
scomer.casacolumbia.org/?page id=7 (last visited May 31, 2011).
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